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answer is that anything may be said to exist in a given universe of discourse if it can be shown that it occupies a position therein. Thus Hamlet's melancholy and reflective character exists in Shakespeare's play, and the roots of equations exist in the number system. For in each case the particular entity can be shown to be demanded by the character of the system and of the other entities in it. So far as logic is applicable to both physics and psychology, neutral logical entities may be said to be parts both of the mental and of the physical series. But in so far as logic is distinguished from physics and psychology, the system of logical entities exists just as truly as the mental or physical systems exist. In our daily routine problems as to existence in the physical system are of tremendous concern, but there is no evidence for the view that existence in the physical or mental system is in any way logically superior to that in the purely logical or other system. This may seem to degrade the term existence, and perhaps it does. But I believe that few habits would be more useful to philosophy than the habit of refusing to discuss whether certain entities exist, unless we ask exist how? or in what kind of a system?

As one looks over the recent literature of the mind-body controversy one can not escape the feeling of the fruitlessness of it all. No important issues seem to grow out of or to depend on the different answers given to these problems. Hence there are to-day a growing number of thinkers who feel that the wisest course is to turn one's back on the whole business and face instead some of the more fruitful problems of philosophy which have been neglected for the sake of the epistemologic adventure. But if such turning one's back on that which our fellow-workers regard as so important is not to be a mere manifestation of the wisdom of the ostrich, we must make certain that we have really eliminated the epistemologic difficulty *as an initial problem*. For woe be unto us if its protean ghost continues to haunt us! A sound epistemology can, therefore, certainly be useful in saving us a lot of wasted effort and freeing our energies for genuinely fruitful problems.

MORRIS R. COHEN.

COLLEGE OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK.

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## DR. WATSON AND THE CONCEPT OF MENTAL DISEASE

DR. WATSON'S contribution to the discussion of *Behavior and the Concept of Mental Disease*<sup>1</sup> is of such paramount importance and touches upon so many points of mutual interest for the psychologist and psychiatrist that I am tempted to ask for some

<sup>1</sup> This JOURNAL, Vol. XIII., p. 589.

space in your valued JOURNAL to comment upon the article in question.

While with many another student of diseases of the nervous system I hold it somewhat regrettable that Dr. Watson should have had the particular straw-man construction cited, through which he sought to obtain the physician's concept of mental disease, yet his handling of certain limited aspects of the problems are so practical that it becomes evident he utilizes a larger concept than the one-sided pattern afforded him through this particular instance. In justice to modern psychiatry it must be said that the paper in question was an extremely naïve and simplistic presentation of the problem of mental disease.

Dr. Watson seems to show a not unusual resistance to certain terminological usages. We sympathize with him, and in historical retrospect are reminded of Galen's interesting comment on the hysteria problem, now as actively discussed as it apparently was then. Galen reminded his readers that the discussion of the terms to be used seemed to constitute the entire activity of the physicians of his day, and he reminded them that it was more important to understand what no doubt Dr. Watson really is most insistent upon, namely, "the behavior of the thing."

The attitude of the behaviorist has century-old warrant and it is a source of much satisfaction that the terminology of the different disciplines of psychology and psychiatry are getting sufficiently mutually interpretable so that the actual conduct of the patient may be described interchangeably in one set of terms or another, and that both shall further our understanding of the "behavior of the thing"; *i. e.*, the sick individual.

If it has seemed to the actual worker with disordered mechanisms that the psychology of the laboratory has been too radically divorced from actual contact with human life and its very practical problems of adjustment and non-adjustment, then this urge to step out into the realm of actual affairs, whose understanding and ultimate control must be grounded in the most profound principles of biology and psychology, marks progress toward a renovation and vitalizing of such a purely theoretical psychology.

For some reason, however, it seems to be balked by a misunderstanding of the function of terminology and the place this occupies in the practical psychology of the Freudian school. The reason seems to lie in the form of explanation of human problems, success or failure in adaptability, which can as yet reach no further than a behavioristic conception of these phenomena. The attitude of approach to the difference between this form of explanation and that which makes what seems to Dr. Watson an unjustifiable and mystical

use of certain terms is nevertheless one which would understand and find the actual working basis which psychology will be constrained to adopt.

The psychopathologist, contrary to Dr. Watson's expressed conviction, is not condemning himself to the use of effete terms of psychology. He has instead taken many of those which had grown meaningless and sterile in the service of a psychology lacking vital application, and appropriated them to the service of concepts which furnished the fuel for rekindling. The new life, however, with which he has informed them confuses, at first, and apparently overwhelms the psychologist and the philosopher whose terms have been snatched away. It leaves them with an empty formalism or at best a behaviorism whose conception of vital human functioning is suggestive of nothing so much as of a fire crackling through a carpet of dry leaves. It reaches to no depths, it involves no profound smoldering sources of conflagration, it leaves no real scars beneath the surface. It merely pursues its way in an increasingly complicated maze of spontaneous action, but all superficial and after all easily traceable. So, it seems, is the purely automatic and reflex conception of life as an explanation of successful adjustments and pitiable maladjustments.

It seems impossible to explain and interpret adaptability and non-adaptability without a third dimension of depth in the life of conduct and behavior. At least this is true if this is to be done constructively, and, of course, no other than a constructive attitude and method can be of any value in psychopathology.

Dr. Watson's behaviorism constitutes a marked advance upon the older mechanistic and facultative psychologies. It maps out to a certain extent the effects of the forces in a way impossible to them and provides an elastic, schematic explanation of these phenomena through the unlimited complexity of automatic and reflex activities. But it is confined to a mechanism and to a materialism conceived in its own way. Therefore its exponent comes away puzzled from the assembly of physicians who accept with satisfaction the concept "mental" in their comprehension and treatment of functional disturbance in adjustment and adaptation. He regrets that they have fallen victims, slaves, to a terminology fast being outgrown. Perhaps these particular ones had, but, as has already been expressed, psychopathology does not look for light in this direction.

Behaviorism scanning but one plane must necessarily be blind to the necessity and utility of such a concept which reaches profoundly into certain very real factors, which seem to extend beyond the purely mechanistic automatic and reflex means of response. It can not conceive just wherein lies the apparent complaisance of the physicians in the acceptance of this concept to which the urgency of human actual-

ities compels them. They find in referring the pathological phenomena under consideration to the "purely mental" that they are provided with a concept of dynamic power, a workable tool which penetrates causes and beginnings and provides a means of reeducation and redistribution of effect involving adequate discharge, before which the colorlessness and ineffectualness of an ideal behavioristic reeducation plainly reveal themselves. It scarcely needed the hypothetical case of the canine "neurasthenic" and "compulsive neurotic" to point the contrast between a purely reflex conception of retraining and the background of complicating and determining factors comprised in the concept "mental."

Are we to consider the human response mechanism and that of the dog as well, as a perfected machine capable of smooth running like the motor car on the street, to be sure as infinitely more complex and varied as the nervous mechanism possesses the ability for developing the complexity of association and multiplied response? Or are there some further dynamic forces which have in the beginning initiated and then developed this delicate and illimitable mechanism for their own service, and utilized it in ability to meet and mold reality or failed in confusion and inability before the exigencies of existence?

Freudians would meet Professor Watson just so far, that they, too, realize the inadequacy of terminology, but then at once they advance to a further position. The partial functional capacity of terms which makes them only symbols of that which can not be crowded into mere words, denies to language merely a place in the system of motor habits. Its importance in this system is a point well emphasized. Yet speech is no more capable than any other motor mechanism of taking the place of affective functioning, but is one of the vehicles through which this is given discharge, an implement which the same affective impulses first formed and are still perfecting for their use.

Neither is it enough to attempt to locate a something "corresponding in part at least to the *affective values* of the psychologists and pathologists," something with which the author supplements the *motor habits* which have so far occupied his discussion in the response of the glandular system. The effect of emotion there is plain to be seen and growing more definite to the understanding with the aid of experimental physiology, but to confine effect there is another matter altogether.

There can be no doubt that psychoneuroses have brought about "habit twists" which have become a faulty equipment in the patient's reactions to life. To acknowledge this is by no means to lose sight of the relation of these habit twists as only forms of expression of a self that is more than a complex and coordinated system of language

habits and bodily habits. It is difficult at a stage of development where language is the chief means for such expression, and so interwoven with every other mode of expression and supplementary to it, to separate it from self-consciousness for purposes of evaluation. But there was something to be expressed before language was formed for this service. Even if it is admitted that such expression merely found other motor channels before these specialized reactions were laid down, what in turn conditioned them and demanded the variety which increases with increasing expansion in that capacity behind the mechanical nervous system? The very fact that the patient can not phrase in terms of words the habit twists which have become a part of his biological equipment would imply that there was something more than merely bodily habit twist. There is something other than a set to the higher nervous centers which compels them to follow a distressing and irresistible mode of futile thought and action, an obsession or a compulsion, something more in the autonomic and sympathetic centers which develop bodily habit disturbances, paralyses, motor ties, derangements of circulation, respiration, nutrition, all of the compensatory or defense reactions, motor and sensory, somatic and psychogenic.

Whence arose the force of the "primary stimulus," such as sex trauma, exposure, masturbation, etc., in childhood to produce such a train of effects in the behavior system? If conscious means only the ability to put into terms of words any and all of one's schemes of reactions, whether of the twisted sort or smoothly concurring motor reflexes, then there is no room for a dynamic self who has both inherited and deposited an historical past, which is now peculiarly his own and which he concentrates into the converging point of a consciousness which deliberately carves into the future. To postulate a being with a biological inheritance which lies only in "conditioned reflexes" does not constitute a sufficient workable explanation for the overwhelming factors of disturbance which act upon such a being. Even the author's "conditioned" implies this further vitalized background.

The physician, then, who is a psychopathologist, and by that the author could not have been in the broader sense "the only psychologist present" at the medical meeting cited, has a dynamic concept full of potentiality for interpretation of phenomena which have been so successfully concealed by the empty terminology of a helpless psychology that the obstructive and destructive nature and extent of their activity have gone,—deplored, but not arrested. A way of understanding and even of discovery of an unsuspected ramification and complexity of such action has been opened through this concept, the pragmatic truth of which, at least, is attested by an effective therapy which is proving itself lasting in result. It has proved

necessary to employ that highly serviceable and convenient tool, language, in order to utilize certain symbols of terminology which should keep clearly before workers in this very practical sphere this *mental* psychogenic concept in its essential dynamic significance and provide for the extension under it of various hypotheses which share its nature and are simply forms of its application.

Freudians are frequently at least tacitly accused of a word fetishism. Here the accusation takes the form of regret that the psychopathologist has fallen under the spell of terminology, and that one to be considered identical with barren psychological concepts. The spirit of life that is blowing over the valley of dry bones is, however, just what the critic fails to appreciate. Transference from the outgrown terminology and concepts alike to behavioristic concepts, a biology on one plane alone, could bring no such revival into a moribund psychology.

The psychologist who sees his terms withdrawn from him into a new sphere, terms in which he himself saw the emptiness and ineffectuality in the vital affairs of men, need not, however, be seized with alarm for the fate of a "useful and fascinating" new growth in the psychopathological world, which is taking to itself such a terminology. He may come away puzzled at the satisfaction of the adherents of the new method because they can shove their problems under the much-abused and well-worn "mental" terminology. This psychologist has made a certain advance through the behavioristic scheme, but this, as we have seen, affords no depth of perspective, no glimpse into the rich background of ultimate cause and conditioning. He misses that revivifying quality which preeminently distinguishes Freud's thought and which his followers have caught and conceived as the essential element of all their work.

It is simply expressed in this often repeated thought that language, terminology, is only a vehicle of expression for that which its symbolism connotes rather than that which it actually denotes, and likewise a tool for again entering into facts and thus controlling them and in turn enlarging the original pragmatic concepts. When Freud and other psychopathologists who accepted this comprehensive outlook began to discover the boundless realities that had lain hidden or were manifested only in inexplicable, but disturbing manner, it was found necessary to comprise these facts as far as possible under some manageable terms and to retain also a comprehensive nomenclature for an individual entity to which these phenomena belonged and from which they arose as manifestations. Mental and psychical both stood ready for such service. Both had been variously employed, both rankly abused in the legitimate, but too often misguided, effort to account for and classify the phenomena which had to a greater or

less extent overwhelmed each thinking individual. Both had come to carry certain concepts which gave no explanation and only served to rationalize or deny or otherwise obscure unwelcome and terrifying facts.

Clear as is this distinctive valuation of terminology, as in itself merely the means and implement, yet equally clear in Freudian thought and practise is its plasticity and adaptability to such use and the close connection that at once is formed with its underlying material. The origin of language and its growth, step by step with human thought and expansion of instinctive life into widening and evolving fields, have left their impress upon the vehicle itself. We can not, therefore, separate even our most exhausted terms from a certain richness, a richness which has become theirs and which revives when they lend themselves once more as here to the service of such vitalizing concepts. They attain a new acquisition of wealth and adapt themselves to further conceptual expansion, if they are kept in contact with actuality in its depth as in extent, with a mental content as with the more exactly appreciable physical phenomena.

Terminology, therefore, conceived thus is no more and no less than that for which it stands. Lifted out of an unproductive psychology and philosophy, which had left it barren and meaningless, into the service of a new and profound method of human understanding and a practical psychotherapy to which such an understanding is bound, it is no wonder the terms seem now a misfit to those who have held the limited concepts which they once denoted or even to those who find a remedy in the limitations of behavioristic attitude.

Such an understanding of the use and value of terminology makes it impossible to accept Jung's "libido" as an *equivalent* of Driesch's "entelechy." What has the latter accomplished, united with its concept, in revolutionizing psychopathology and actually reawakening the patient borne down and cut off from the world of real events and achievement by an incomprehensible load? Has it explained injurious factors, brought them under control, and guided to readjustment and development of capabilities hitherto unrecognized or deemed impossible? This has been the service of the libido concept directed under its expanded terminology toward human lives, as every psychoanalyst could testify. There is all the difference between a concept built upon an abundance of facts accessible in turn to further exploration and discovery of the very facts out of which it originally arose, and a philosophically defined speculation of<sup>2</sup> "an agent . . . that acts 'into' space . . . that belongs to nature in the purely logical sense in which we use the word," but that does not come into actual pragmatic contact with facts to evaluate and readjust them.

<sup>2</sup> Driesch, *The History and Theory of Vitalism*, London, 1914.



The limitation of the behavioristic psychology, if a behaviorist would admit, as Professor Watson seems indeed to do, the application of the term psychology to his system, implying as it does a psychical reality, a "mental," reveals itself in the author's acknowledged method of teaching the Freudian movement. So little must be left when he has stricken out the "crude vitalistic and psychological terminology" that the wide mantle of Freudian conceptualism must indeed seem to cling with keenly felt inappropriateness about the shrunken body of the narrowed "psychology" of so-called biological factors limited to one sphere. The really vitalistic factors of humanity are for some reason excluded. Interest seems, strangely, not to lie with them, or are they perhaps too "crude" to be acceptable even to this "for some years . . . earnest student of Freud"?

The introduction of this word "crude" affords striking contrast between the psychoanalysis of Freud and other physicians who are pragmatically exponents of the mental and the psychologist of the other limited method. It doubtless also gives a clue to the fundamental reason for accepting a limited mechanistic explanation for richer phenomena. Opponents of Freudianism are becoming more and more prepared for this interpretation of their differences and antagonisms as resistance measures, but since Freud's concepts have their origin in experience and are working with facts this explanation is unavoidable, for human realities are the same whether we are adherents or opponents or subjects of the method which is seeking to get at the truth. In this case the author's use of the word betrays itself.

A greater point of interest, however, lies in a consideration of the word itself which manifests the difference in the two attitudes. At what point may we drop out the "crude vitalistic" terminology? At what stage in human psychic development is a factor distinguished as crude and when does it cease to appear as such? Is not the crude just as much a part of human experience and evolution as something to which we might give another name? Is the value of the crude less than that of the refined, or whatever we should call it, in the contemplation of the whole of human existence, its manifold features and the exigencies of its development? When do standards of value and judgment become fixed in the dynamic onrush of psychic life, the effort of the libido—for these terms may now be used—toward expression and creation, that we may cast aside certain portions as crude and no longer worthy of taking into account?

To be sure the retention of the crude—to admit a comparison with progressive standards—and its enrollment among the factors of mental life entitled to serious consideration presupposes the acceptance of the concept of the unconscious and the survival of a psychic

life which, too, has its biological history and in which there is a conservation of memory images with accompanying emotion or affect. This hypothesis of a profounder reality was also called into being by discovered facts. Biological conservation in the behavioristic sense neither accounts for these facts nor could it deal with them in a complete constructive therapeutic or a comprehensive understanding of human problems and possibilities. It alone can not arrive at the more complete results dependent upon a larger conception, yet it affords a practically illuminating description of the manner in which the psychical factors work. It is much to have realized the emptiness of the old terminology as it was employed. A further step will be to enter into the fuller conception which has revitalized these terms.

SMITH ELY JELLIFFE.

NEW YORK CITY.

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#### REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

*India and Its Faiths.* JAMES BISSETT PRATT. Houghton Mifflin Company, 1915.

When the reviewer first saw Professor Pratt's book advertised, he decided not to purchase it, on the ground that a visitor of a single winter season in India, admittedly not a specialist in Indian religions, could hardly be expected to contribute anything of special value to a subject of such great complexity and difficulty. The average book written under such circumstances is apt to be a disappointment. But this book is distinctly better than the average of its kind. The author remarks in the preface that he is neither a Sanskritist, a missionary, nor a convert to some Oriental cult, and that this perhaps constitutes his chief qualification for writing on India, in that he has no ax to grind and has centered on present-day issues. This has certainly preserved him from the mass of citations from ancient texts that makes Hopkins's *Religions of India* rather hard reading for the layman, from the frequent comparisons with Christianity that render so much missionary literature distasteful to the agnostic scholar, and from the extravagances that make Oriental devotees absurd to all but themselves. On the positive side, Professor Pratt is evidently a keen observer, who has made excellent use of his opportunities for observation and personal interviews, and who indicates a very fair acquaintance with the general literature in English on the subject. The fact that so much that he saw and heard was fresh to him gives a charm of enthusiasm to his narrative, while the character of the individuals whom he interviewed renders their statements of interest to the student as well as to the novice.